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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Those provisions of the Utah Constitution and Utah statutes 
cited herein are reproduced in the Addendum. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is not the intent of this Reply Brief to rebut point by 
point the arguments made by the state. Appellant stands on the 
argument of the principal brief as being sufficient to show that 
his sentence should be vacated. 
This Reply Brief is intended to respond in general themes to 
assist the court in remaining focused on the issues presented. 
For example, it is shown herein that the various procedural 
objections of the state to the presentation of the issues are 
misplaced and that this court may fully consider the substantive 
points raised. 
This Reply Brief shows that the substantive questions of 
ineffective assistance of counsel have not been effectively 
rebutted by the state. When one adds up the numerous omissions 
of the original counsel, it is seen# taken as a total picture, 
that Mr. Parsons did not receive effective assistance of counsel 
at a level required by the federal and Utah Constitutions. 
The legal framework is in place for this court to hold that 
representation in a habeas corpus proceeding arising from a 
capital offense should be provided by the state for an indigent 
petitioner. With the framework in place, all that is needed is 
for this court to make a fundamental public policy decision and 
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thereby breathe life into the applicable constitutional provi-
sions protecting accused persons. 
ARGUMENT 
A. ALL OF APPELLANT'S ISSUES STAND PROCEDURALLY 
CORRECT BEFORE THE COURT FOR DECISION 
The state weaves through its brief several claims that 
certain issues of the appellant are not appropriately before this 
court because of procedural defects. A close examination of the 
record shows that Parsons has all of his issues properly before 
this court for decision. 
The state argues first at page 7 of its brief that the issue 
of whether the two depositions taken by the state were taken in 
violation of fundamental rights is not properly before the court. 
The state correctly points out that an accused is required to 
raise all appropriate issues in the original direct appeal absent 
unusual circumstances justifying the failure to raise the issue. 
The state further correctly points out that the unusual circum-
stances exception is raised when claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel are made and the same counsel represented the accused 
at trial and on appeal. Gerrish v. Barnes, 202 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 
(Utah 1992). 
The record shows that in the Amended Complaint for Extraor-
dinary Writ — Habeas Corpus, Parsons alleged that depositions 
were taken in violation of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and constitute a denial of the defendant's right to due process, 
denial of the right to confront witnesses, and denial of right to 
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effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages of the 
criminal proceeding. Third Dist. R., p. 17. A reading of this 
Amended Complaint shows that this issue was raised in the context 
of ineffective assistance of counsel and, admittedly, interwoven 
with the direct claim of violation of constitutional rights. 
Parsons later filed a Statement of Claims with the Third 
District Court which further explained, at page 4, that claims 
were made of constitutional violations in the taking of these 
depositions. Third Dist. R., p. 113. The issues were raised 
again in the Trial Brief in the Third District Court and were 
considered over the objection of the state at that time. Third 
Dist. R., p. 188. 
Summarizing the record, Parsons raised in the Third District 
Court the taking of key depositions as a direct violation of 
certain constitutional rights and as evidence of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for the failure to object to the taking of 
the depositions. The unusual circumstances required by Gerrish 
are raised by this proceeding. First, if the court agrees that 
the taking of sworn depositions of witnesses after charging 
constitutes a violation of constitutional rights, an obvious 
injustice or substantial denial of a constitutional right oc-
curred in the original trial court. Second, where the same 
counsel represented Mr. Parsons at trial and at appeal, failure 
to make a timely objection to the taking of these depositions is 
evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel which may be 
considered in a habeas corpus proceeding. 
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The second major procedural objection the state makes at 
page 44 of its brief is that Parsons abandoned his federal 
arguments in the trial court concerning whether he is entitled to 
representation at the expense of the government. The state 
supports its objection by referring to a Memorandum in Opposition 
to a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Parsons in 
which he focuses his argument on Utah constitutional principles. 
Third Dist. R., p. 92. An examination of the record shows that 
Parsons always claimed that he had a right to costs, expenses, 
and fees for counsel and investigators under the United States 
Constitution. His Amended Complaint, at page 5, so stated 
initially. Third Dist. R., p. 21. The Memorandum was a response 
to a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the question of 
payment of attorney's fees. Third Dist. R., p. 46. The next 
consideration of the point is the final ruling of the trial court 
which does not state whether the court considered federal consti-
tutional issues. Third Dist. R., p. 280. 
In summary, Parsons raised the federal constitution in 
claiming he was entitled to have counsel provided in a habeas 
corpus proceeding, the state attacked the issue by summary 
judgment to which response was made primarily in light of the 
state constitution, and the motion was denied. The federal 
questions pled in the Amended Complaint were still before the 
court and denied without mentioning either the federal or state 
constitutions. There is no real evidence of an abandonment of 
reliance upon the federal constitution. 
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While the trial court did not make clear to what extent it 
considered the federal constitution on this point, it is apparent 
that the issue is properly before the court now. This court has 
long held that an exception to the general rule that issues not 
raised at trial cannot be raised later is when constitutional 
issues are raised when a person's liberty is at stake. Pratt v. 
City Council of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172 (Utah 1981). The Utah 
Court of Appeals has more recently affirmed that rule by stating 
constitutional issues may be raised for the first time on appeal 
where liberty is at stake. Johnson v. Department of Employment 
Sec., 782 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1989). 
The objection of the state to the raising of federal consti-
tutional issues at this point is not well taken because such 
issues could have been raised even if Parsons had not pled them 
at the trial court level. 
B. DEPOSITIONS TAKEN REMAIN A PER SE VIOLATION OF RIGHTS 
Parsons raises on appeal issues addressing two depositions 
taken by the prosecutor after Parsons was charged and without the 
presence of Parsons or his counsel. The arguments made in the 
principal brief are not repeated here. 
A reading of the state's brief shows that its response does 
not meet squarely the constitutional arguments but, instead, is 
merely a relabeling of the depositions as mere sworn statements 
given to the prosecutor. The effect of this is to reduce the 
proceeding from one of formality to nothing more than a casual 
recorded interview with prosecutors and police officers. 
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Parsons does not claim that a prosecutor or police officer 
may not interview a key witness prior to trial. A fundamental 
error occurs here because of the taking of an oath. The taking 
of an oath constitutes a legal turning point at which penalties 
under the law attach for willful misstatements. Spanaler v. 
District Court of Salt Lake County, 104 Utah 584, 140 P.2d 755 
(Utah 1943) . 
The Utah Code is particularly instructive where it provides 
in §68-3-12(2)(k) that in construing statutes, courts are to 
consider that every oral statement under oath is embraced in the 
term "testify". Put another way# the Utah Code is defining 
testify as statements made under oath. These depositions are, 
then, "testimony". 
The penalty which attaches is found in §76-8-502 which 
provides for punishment of a second degree felony for false 
material statements under oath. 
One searches the law in vain for penalties attaching to 
misstatements made to a prosecutor in an informal interview. One 
also searches the law in vain to find authority for a prosecutor 
to take a "sworn statement" outside of the rules of criminal 
procedure. 
In light of the significance of the giving of an oath, the 
original argument made by Parsons remains unrefuted. Depositions 
in this case were taken at a critical stage of the proceeding 
because charging had occurred. Witness testimony was taken under 
circumstances in which their stories were locked in without 
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benefit of cross-examination. The chilling effect on a witness 
later at trial to alter their statement in any way is obvious. 
The claim by the state that the defense counsel used the 
statements in his cross-examination is without legal signifi-
cance. The fact that the defense counsel later used them at 
trial for questioning purposes does not mean that witnesses were 
effectively confronted and cross-examined when their testimony 
was originally taken. The argument is a red herring that fails 
to focus on the principal issue that the constitutional damage 
had already been done when the depositions were taken after 
charging, under oath, and without notice to and attendance of the 
defense counsel. 
Finally, the state's argument that Parsons be required to 
show that the witnesses were somehow tainted is again misplaced. 
The analogous situation of tainted line-ups carries no such 
requirement. Line-ups are to either be done constitutionally 
correct or the identification is suppressed. There is no subjec-
tive questioning of the witness if there is an objective showing 
that the actual procedures used were inappropriate. See, State 
v. McCumberP 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980). The same constitutional 
defect is present here. The taking of a deposition without 
confrontation through cross-examination similarly can be presumed 
to taint the proceeding because of the potential second degree 
felony chargeable to the witness that changes testimony later. 
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The failure to object at trial to this procedure was inef-
fective assistance of counsel and, standing alone, justifies the 
vacating of the sentence of death. 
C. THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS 
HAVE NOT BEEN REFUTED 
Parsons has adequately stated his claims concerning the 
ineffective assistance of counsel and a point by point response 
to the state is unnecessary. Some general responses are offered, 
however, where considered helpful to the court. 
1. Investigation 
The state argues that defense counsel made a sufficient 
pretrial investigation contrary to the claim of Parsons. There 
is considerable irony in the state's reliance for this argument 
on page 24 of its brief on statements addressing the issue of 
whether the victim had homosexual tendencies taken from the 
depositions which Parsons claims were constitutionally deficient. 
The fact remains that the record shows that defense counsel did 
minimal effort to make inquiry into this key area of defense and 
Parsons does not know what an adequate investigation would have 
revealed. The state's response is merely to argue the evidence 
presented shows the victim did not have homosexual orientation 
and begs the substantive issue of whether a thorough investiga-
tion should have been made. 
Mr. Parsons is being sent to his death not knowing what 
information was available because defense counsel did not thor-
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oughly investigate the fundamental facts of his basic mitigating 
defense. This inadequate representation should not be condoned. 
2. Jury Voir Dire 
The state makes an overstatement of considerable importance 
on page 37 of its brief. The state argues that a sufficient 
questioning of the potential jurors was made and goes on to state 
that each juror was asked what information had been received 
about the case. In fact, none of the jurors was asked what they 
had heard about the case. That is the very purpose that Parsons 
lists the transcript pages of the voir dire of each juror on page 
35 of his principal brief. 
This failure to ask the jurors what they heard is at the 
heart of the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. A 
reading of the voir dire of each of those jurors shows that 
nobody asked them what information they had received. They made 
only general statements that they had read about the case in the 
newspaper or heard about it in other local media but never 
explained exactly what they had heard. 
What a particular juror had heard is far more important to 
know than the mere fact that they had heard something. Absent 
that specific inquiry there can be no determination of whether 
opinions were formed and conclusions drawn on information outside 
of the evidence. This oversight of basic inquiry is additional 
evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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3. Discovery Request 
The state argues at page 31 of its brief that the failure of 
a defense counsel to make a formal request for discovery does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. This court has not 
directly addressed the question but the state cites the recent 
case of State v. Vigilr 840 P.2d 788 (Utah App. 1992), for the 
proposition that failure to file a discovery request is not per 
se ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Vigil involved the claim on direct appeal of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for failure of the defense counsel to file 
a discovery request with the prosecutor. The Court of Appeals 
refused to find ineffective assistance of counsel where the 
record was clear that the defense counsel conducted an adequate 
and thorough investigation. 
Vigil does not apply to Parsons for two reasons. The first, 
discussed in considerable detail in the principal brief, is that 
his defense counsel did not conduct an adequate investigation. 
As explained in the principal brief, Iron County made available 
an investigator at the expense of the county which was never 
used. No legal obligation except the general obligation to 
disclose exculpatory evidence was imposed on the prosecutor to 
produce evidence. Vigil is distinguishable because of this lack 
of investigation. 
The second reason Vigil does not apply is that it appears to 
have been decided wrongly by the Court of Appeals. Again, as 
explained in the original brief, Utah has no Supreme Court case 
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on point. The closest one can come is State v. Tempiinf 805 P.2d 
182 (Utah 1990), which stands for the proposition that failure to 
conduct an investigation is not a tactical decision and consti-
tutes per se ineffective assistance of counsel. While acknowl-
edging Tempiin. Vigil really does not follow its holding by 
finding that a motion for discovery does not constitute per se 
ineffective assistance of counsel. It is hard to harmonize the 
Tempiin requirement that counsel actively pursue investigation 
with the Vigil holding that the sending of a short request for 
discovery to the prosecutor may be excused. Without repeating 
the arguments made in the principal brief, this court should hold 
that failure to conduct the simple act of formal discovery, 
especially in a capital homicide case, is per se ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
4. Special Verdict Form 
The state responds to the Parsons claim that the Special 
Verdict Form was constitutionally defective by several responses. 
The first response is that this court approved the Special 
Verdict Form in the original appeal. 
While the original appeal did consider some issues concern-
ing jury instructions, an examination of the case shows that the 
issue presented here was not raised. See, State v. Parsons, 781 
P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989). The thrust of the argument made here is 
that the original defense counsel missed certain key issues 
which, if properly presented to this court, would have shown that 
there were serious defects in the Special Verdict Form and the 
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way it interacted with the jury instructions• Put simply, this 
court has not ruled on the issues presented in this proceeding. 
The state next argues that the jury is free to consider 
generally aggravating circumstances when making a determination 
of penalty and that the inclusion of the aggravating circumstance 
of acting for pecuniary gain was not prejudicial. 
In a pure and abstract sense, the state's argument is 
correct. That is, a jury is free to consider a number of aggra-
vating circumstances, including those not contained in the 
statute defining murder in the first degree, for purposes of 
assessing the penalty. The argument breaks down here because of 
the actual structure of the verdict form and the jury instruc-
tions. 
At the risk of repeating the argument in the principal 
brief, the court is again invited to read jury instructions 14, 
15, 15A, 18, and 27 with the Special Verdict Form. Fifth Dist. 
R., pp. 267 - 270, 273 - 274, 283 - 284, 297 - 299. The court 
will see that the instructions generally tell the jury that if 
they find any of the aggravating circumstances listed on the 
Special Verdict Form that the penalty of death is justified. The 
problem is, of course, that the pecuniary gain aggravating 
circumstance is actually a duplication of the robbery aggravating 
circumstance. Additionally, the aggravating circumstance that 
Mr. Parsons was a person on parole in possession of a firearm is 
not a justification, standing alone, for the imposition of 
capital punishment stated by §76-5-202. 
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The practical effect of listing aggravating circumstances on 
a special verdict form is to enhance the likelihood of finding 
for the death penalty for a juror that has not studied the Utah 
Code, If one adopts the state's argument, the trial court just 
as easily could have put on the Special Verdict Form that the 
jury could consider that the defendant stole a motorcycle once, 
violated the law of hitchhiking, etc. While other wrongful acts 
may bear on the question of the character and history of the 
accused in weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
placing them on a special verdict form clearly elevates their 
importance in the total mix of the decision. The implication of 
the Special Verdict Form is that the jury, in theory, could find 
that Parsons did not do the killing in the course of an aggravat-
ed robbery nor for pecuniary gain but could still impose the 
death penalty for being a person on parole in possession of a 
firearm when a killing occurred even though the firearm was not 
the instrument of death in the homicide. 
The state further tries to avoid the problem of the duplica-
tion of aggravating circumstances when robbery and homicide for 
pecuniary gain are considered by arguing factually that Parsons 
committed the offense for pecuniary gain. In fact, an examina-
tion of the state's argument, at page 40, shows no citation to 
the record that there was any evidence that the offense was 
committed for pecuniary gain other than Parsons had the victim's 
wallet, car, and personal effects after the offense. As pointed 
out in the principal brief, robbery for the purpose of obtaining 
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money or property is not pecuniary gain within the meaning of the 
statute at issue. See People v. Adcox, 763 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1988). 
The fact remains that the blending together of aggravating 
circumstances in the instructions with circumstances justifying 
alone imposing the death penalty was misleading and clearly had 
the potential of construing deliberation toward imposition of the 
death penalty. Failure to identify and object to these issues 
was a substantial error on the part of the defense counsel which 
merits reversal of the sentence. 
D. STRICKLAND SHOULD NOT BE 
STRICTLY APPLIED TO THIS CASE 
One of the major themes of the state in responding to all of 
the issues concerning ineffective assistance of counsel is to 
seek safe harbor in the requirements of Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland applies a two prong test for 
ineffective assistance of counsel. The first prong requires the 
defendant to show that there was some error in the defense with 
the second prong requiring the defendant to show that prejudice 
affecting the outcome occurred. 
Parsons admits in his principal brief that Strickland could 
be barrier to his claims made here and confronts the issue head-
on by asking this court to not apply Strickland in the circum-
stances presented. Not unexpectedly, the state argues that 
Strickland should control because Parsons fails to make a clear 
showing that the outcome would have been different with respect 
to certain issues. 
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Strickland is conceptually quite appealing on its face. It 
makes for easy memorized rules that resolve a number of cases in 
hornbook fashion. The problem is that Strickland breaks down in 
the reality of the situation in which Mr. Parsons finds himself. 
The record clearly shows that Mr. Parsons is an indigent person 
incarcerated on Utah's death row, dependent upon pro bono ap-
pointed counsel, who is a civil litigator advised by one of the 
state's busiest criminal defense attorneys. The imposition of 
the second prong of Strickland under these circumstances is 
unconscionable and does not measure up to fundamental notions of 
fair play and justice. The following matrix is offered to show 
the impact of Strickland in a practical sense on Parsons: 
1. 
4. 
ISSUE 
Taking of 
depositions, 
2. 
3. 
No investi-
gation was 
made. 
Advice to 
plead guilty 
inappropri-
ate. 
Juror/ 
witness con-
tact. 
STRICKLAND REQUIRES 
Counsel would have 
impeached statements 
at time of deposition, 
The investigation 
would have turned up 
exculpatory informa-
tion. 
Defendant would not 
have pled guilty. 
Juror was influenced 
by contact with wit-
ness. 
PARSONS 
PRACTICAL POSITION 
Counsel was not 
present, never ob-
jected, additional 
interviews are needed 
in southern Utah and 
California, in pris-
on, indigent. 
No real investigation 
was done, in prison, 
no money, trail grows 
cold. 
Strickland require-
ment met — Parsons 
own testimony and 
supporting testimony 
of expert at trial. 
Counsel did not ex-
plore at trial fully, 
interviews needed, in 
prison, indigent. 
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5. No discovery Discovery requests 
requests 
were made. 
would have produced 
material evidence. 
Preliminary 
hearing 
waiver 
Counsel un-
prepared 
Venue — 
jury voir 
dire 
Special Ver-
dict Form 
Would not have pled 
guilty. 
Outcome would have 
been different. 
Jury was biased by 
pretrial information, 
Deliberations wrong-
fully construed toward 
death. 
No motion having been 
made, right to find 
out anything has been 
forever waived under 
State v. Booker, 709 
P.2d 342 (Utah 1985), 
no resources for in-
vestigation. 
Strickland met — 
Parsons own testimo-
ny, evidence of du-
ress, and statements 
of expert at Third 
District trial. 
Can only be shown 
through adequate in-
vestigation, in pris-
on, indigent. 
Counsel did not ask 
what they heard after 
admitted hearing 
something, opportuni-
ty to question forev-
er lost. 
Counsel did not ob-
ject, but Strickland 
met — instructions 
and verdict form are 
patently defective. 
Put at it most basic, Strickland just does not work in all 
cases. There are, no doubt, a number of issues in which a 
defendant might reasonably be expected to show that the act or 
failure to act of his defense counsel would have changed the 
outcome. State v. Tempiinf 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), which 
incorporates Strickland into Utah jurisprudence, is an example of 
where the standard could be met because of the complete failure 
to investigate. The issues faced by Parsons as an indigent 
person, with pro bono counsel in prison without resources are not 
subject to a showing of a different outcome absent the investment 
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of resources. Practical problems, such as having forever missed 
the opportunity to conduct a proper jury voir dire cannot be 
addressed in a reasonable manner because the jurors have been 
dismissed. Only an objective review of the process gives a fair 
test of the issue. 
This court is asked to make a reasonable application of the 
Strickland second prong by modifying it to consider the nature of 
the issue raised and the relative practical ability of an accused 
to address the issue. 
E. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IS IN PLACE 
FOR STATE PROVIDED COUNSEL 
Page 45 of the state's brief, which accuses Parsons of 
providing "no legal analysis11 and engaging in a "ploy" in the 
presentation of the argument made cries for a response. 
An examination of Parsons' principal brief at pages 42-45 
shows that he identifies those federal cases which were invoked 
in the lower court by the state as support for the proposition 
that there is no right in a habeas corpus proceeding for counsel 
provided by the state. Contrary to the statement that there is 
no legal analysis of these cases, a review of those pages shows 
that there is specific recognition of the holding of the cases 
and they are distinguished. The author of the brief then leaves 
it to the state to make its own argument after distinguishing the 
cases. Rather than being a ploy, an ethical obligation was met 
to identify seemingly relevant contrary authority. 
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In Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), an indigent 
prisoner petitioned for post-trial relief raising identical 
issues that were raised in the direct appeal. Interestingly, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that she was entitled under state 
law to appointed counsel in her post-conviction proceedings. 
That counsel withdrew finding that the issues raised by his 
client were frivolous and another appointed counsel successfully 
argued to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that the first counsel 
improperly withdrew under the standards of Anders v. California, 
386 U.S. 738 (1967). 
The Supreme Court rejected the application of Anders to the 
claims made because Anders assumed an underlying right to ap-
pointed counsel. The Supreme Court stated that it had never held 
that prisoners mounting collateral attacks upon their convictions 
were entitled under the Constitution to a right to appointed 
counsel. 
A reading of the Supreme Court's analysis shows that they 
place heavy emphasis in their decision on the fact that the 
underlying action was a "discretionary appeal". 
The case is distinguishable because the state actually 
provided appointed counsel. There is, admittedly, dicta suggest-
ing that there is no federal obligation to provide counsel for a 
so-called discretionary appeal. This dicta loses force because 
of the presence of appointed counsel and because the issue 
considered was whether the earlier counsel had wrongfully with-
drawn. The case does not involve the direct request by an 
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accused person for appointed counsel in a state granted habeas 
corpus proceeding where access to habeas corpus relief exists as 
a matter of right under the state constitution. 
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), appears on its face 
supportive of the state's position here. There, an inmate under 
a sentence of death brought a federal civil rights action against 
the state of Virginia claiming that his rights had been violated 
for the failure of the state to provide him counsel for state 
post-conviction relief. The court refers to Finley and states 
that neither the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
nor the Equal Protection Clause requires a state to appoint 
counsel for indigent prisoners seeking state post-conviction 
relief. 
Murray v. Giarratano is essentially a five/four decision but 
has four opinions issued. The question of a federal requirement 
of appointed attorney for post-trial relief is obviously an 
uncertain one. The case does not discuss the impact of habeas 
corpus relief being available as a matter of right in the state 
constitution as contained in the Utah Constitution. The majority 
opinion clearly talks in terms of discretionary appeals in the 
state's system as being relatively insignificant for constitu-
tional considerations. 
Parsons suggests to this court that the door is left open 
for the court to analogize to those federal cases which hold that 
where a first appeal of right is given, states are obligated 
under the federal constitution to appoint counsel to allow 
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meaningful access to the system. Granting of a right to habeas 
corpus in Article I, Section 5, of the Utah Constitution takes 
the proceeding in this state out of the realm of an act of grace 
by the state into a right of substance. 
As Justice Stewart explained in Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 
(Utah 1989), habeas corpus relief in Utah holds a special role in 
Utah jurisprudence. Habeas corpus is as important in the context 
of a proceeding claiming ineffective assistance of counsel when 
the original defense counsel was the same counsel for direct 
appeal as a direct appeal. A defendant convicted contrary to 
constitutional principles has no meaningful relief in these 
circumstances other than the right to habeas corpus relief. 
As pointed out in the principal brief, the state constitu-
tion also provides framework for requiring the state to provide 
counsel in habeas corpus matters. The right to habeas corpus in 
Article I, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution is contained in the 
same article as the right to direct appeal in Section 12 of 
Article I. From a convicted person's point of view, relief 
obtained from direct appeal or from attack through the right of 
habeas corpus is indistinguishable. Both routes take one to the 
same courts to consider fundamental constitutional issues. It 
defies logic to find a fundamental right under Section 12 of 
Article I which requires the appointment of counsel while not 
applying the same right for a substantially similar right found 
in Section 5. See, State v. Johnsonf 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981). 
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Other states have found that their constitution guarantees 
equal access for post-trial relief through appointed counsel. In 
Nichols v, State, 425 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1967), the state constitu-
tion was held to require appointed counsel. See also, Roberts v. 
State, 751 P.2d 507 (Alaska App. 1988). Kansas also so held 
under both the federal and state constitutions in State
 f ex rel. 
Stephen v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1987). 
This court is respectfully requested to hold that which is 
fundamentally fair. This court is asked to find that where there 
is a state granted right of habeas corpus relief that stands on 
an equal footing under the state constitution with the first 
direct appeal that the federal Constitution requires equal access 
to the system. The court is further respectfully requested to 
find that the state constitution requires the appointment of 
counsel for the first exercise of the right of habeas corpus in a 
capital homicide case. 
CONCLUSION 
This court is respectfully requested to vacate the sentence 
of death of Mr. Parsons. 
DATED this <2(* ~ day of February, 1993. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
GREGORY<3V S^N£>ERS, ESQ. 
KIRK G. GIBBS, ESQ. 
RONALD J. YENGICH, ESQ. 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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A 
§ 6 8 - 3 - 1 2 , U . C A . 
68*3-12. General rules. 
In the construction of these statutes the following rules shall be observed, 
unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the 
Legislature or repugnant to the context of the statute: 
(1) "Month" means a calendar month, unless otherwise expressed, and 
the word "year," or the abbreviation "A.D." is equivalent to the expres-
sion "year of our Lord." 
(2) "Oath" includes "affirmation," and the word "swear" includes "af-
firm." Every oral statement under oath or affirmation is embraced in the 
term "testify," and every written one, in the term "depose." 
(3) "Signature" includes any name, mark, or sign written with the 
intent to authenticate any instrument or writing, 
(4) "Writing" includes printing, handwriting, and typewriting. 
(5) "Person" includes individuals, bodies politic and corporate, partner-
ships, associations, and companies. 
(6) The singular number includes the plural, and the plural the singu-
lar. 
(7) Words used in one gender comprehend the other. 
(8) Words used in the present tense include the future. 
(9) "Property" includes both real and personal property. 
(10) "Land," "real estate," and "real property" include land, tenements, 
hereditaments, water rights, possessory rights, and claims. 
(11) "Personal property" includes every description of money, goods, 
chattels, effects, evidences of rights in action, and all written instruments 
by which any pecuniary obligation, right or title to property is created, 
acknowledged, transferred, increased, defeated, discharged, or dimin-
ished, and every right or interest therein. 
B 
§ 7 6 - 5 - 2 0 2 , U.C.A. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree if the actor 
intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another under any of the fol* 
lowing circumstances: 
(a) The homicide was committed by a person who is confined in a jail or 
other correctional institution, 
(b) The homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of 
conduct, or criminal episode during which two or more persons are killed. 
(c) The actor knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other 
than the victim and the actor. / 
(d) The homicide was committed while the actor was engaged in the 
commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or 
attempting to commit, aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, rape of a child, 
object rape, object rape of a child, forcible sodomy, sodomy upon a child, 
sexual abuse of a child, child abuse of a child under the age of 14 years, as 
otherwise defined in Subsection 76-5-109(2Xa), or aggravated sexual as-
sault, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated burglary, burglary, aggra-
vated kidnaping, kidnaping, or child kidnaping. 
(e) The homicide was committed for the purpose of avoiding or prevent-
ing an arrest of the defendant or another by a peace officer acting under 
color of legal authority or for the purpose of effecting the defendants or 
another's escape from lawful custody. 
(f) The homicide was committed for pecuniary or other personal gain. 
(g) The defendant committed, or engaged or employed another person 
to commit the homicide pursuant to an agreement or contract for remu-
neration or the promise of remuneration for commission of the homicide. 
(h) The actor was previously convicted of first or second degree murder 
or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person. For the 
purpose of this paragraph an offense committed in another jurisdiction, 
which if committed in Utah would be punishable as first or second degree 
murder, is deemed first or second degree murder. 
(i) The homicide was committed for the purpose of: (i) preventing a 
witness from testifying; (ii) preventing a person from providing evidence 
or participating in any legal proceedings or official investigation; (iii) 
retaliating against a person for testifying, providing evidence, or partici-
pating in any legal proceedings or official investigation; or (iv) disrupting 
or hindering any lawful governmental function or enforcement of laws. 
(j) The victim is or has been a local, state, or federal public official, or a 
candidate for public office, and the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is 
related to that official position, act, capacity, or candidacy. 
(k) The victim is or has been a peace officer, law enforcement officer, 
executive officer, prosecuting officer, jailer, prison official, firefighter, 
judge or other court official, juror, probation officer, or parole officer, and 
the victim is either on duty or the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is 
related to that official position, and the actor knew or reasonably should 
have known that the victim holds or has held that official position. 
(1) The homicide was committed by means of a destructive device, 
bomb, explosive, infernal machine, or similar device which the actor 
planted, hid, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or struc-
ture, or mailed or delivered, or caused to be planted, hidden, concealed, 
mailed, or delivered and the actor knew or reasonably should have known 
that his act or acts would create a great risk of death to human life. 
(m) The homicide was committed during the act of unlawfully assum-
ing control of any aircraft, train, or other public conveyance by use of 
threats or force with intent to obtain any valuable consideration for the 
release of the public conveyance or any passenger, crew member, or any 
other person aboard, or to direct the route or movement of the public 
conveyance or otherwise exert control over the public conveyance. 
(n) The homicide was committed by means of the administration of a 
poison or of any lethal substance or of any substance administered in a 
lethal amount, dosage, or quantity. 
(o) The victim was a person held or otherwise detained as a shield, 
hostage, or for ransom. 
(p) The actor was under a sentence of life imprisonment or a sentence 
of death at the time of the commission of the homicide. 
(q) The homicide was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, 
cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner, any of which must be demon-
*_A-J u.. •**, «..;*•! f/irfiirA oprimis nhvsical abuse, or serious bodily in-
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§ 7 6 - 8 - 5 0 2 , U.C.A. 
76-8-502. False or inconsistent material statements. 
A person is guilty of a felony of the second degree if in any official proceed-
ing: 
(1) He makes a false material statement under oath or affirmation or 
swears or affirms the truth of a material statement previously made and 
he does not believe the statement to be true; or 
(2) He makes inconsistent material statements under oath or affirma-
tion, both within the period of limitations, one of which is false and not 
believed by him to be true. In a prosecution under this section, it need not 
be alleged or proved which of the statements is false but only that one or 
the other was false and not believed by the defendant to be true. 
D 
Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 5 and 
Article I, Section 12 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS 
Sec. 5. iHabeas corpus,] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in 
case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it 
See. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy foi the same offense. 
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